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Points the City intends to rely on for reversal of judg-
ment Case No. 8122 
Page 8. 
1. The court erred in finding that the Plaintiff and 
Respondent railroad owned the Easterly part of second 
West extending from 53rd to 64th South Streets, that is 
the property in question i.e. that East of a point 11 feet 
vVest of the center of said tracks. 
(a) The public acquired the right to use Second 
'Vest Street as a public highway by grant under 
43 U.S.C.A. 932 prior to the issuance of patent. 
(b) The railroad's right to maintain its line over 
the land in question must depend on Deeds from 
patentees and the patents and deeds were subject 
to existing rights in the public to maintain a high-
way. 
(c) The width of Second South when established 
was such width as was reasonably necessary for 
public easement. 
(d) The public thoroughfare ·once established has 
never been abandoned. 
Argument 
Point 1 (a) Page 9 
Point 1 (b) Page 12 
Point 1 (c) Page 16 
Point 1 (d) Page 18 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
S'TATE OF UTAH 
OREGON SHORT LINE RAILROAD 
COMPANY, a Corporation, and UNION 
PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a 
Corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs.-
MURRA Y CITY, a municipal corpora-
tion, and STATEWIDE PLUMBING 
AND HEATING COMPANY, INC., a 
Corporation, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF· FACTS 
Case No. 
8122 
Both the Oregon Short Line Railroad Company and 
Defendant Murray City claim to be the owner of a strip 
of land approximately four ( 4) rods wide running in a 
northerly and southerly direction from what is now 
known as 5300 South in Murray City to 6400 South at a 
point known of as 200 West (R. 3). 
Murray City was, in the spring of 1953, engaged in 
laying a sewer, one main of which ran the full length of 
the above piece of ground which was known of as Second 
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We,st Street in Murray. The railroad company claimed 
that the City merely had a prescriptive right to the 
travelled portion of the land and that this prescriptive 
right did not include the right to install a sewer under-
ground. The railroad brought this action to enjoin the 
City from installing its sewer upon S.econd West Street 
(R.l-7). 
The City claimed that the land in question was a pub-
lic highway and had been such prior to 1871 and that the 
railroad merely had an easement down the middle of the 
street and the City, by constructing a sewer was not inter-
fering in any way with the railroad's easement (R. 8-12). 
The City was also engaged in running sewer lines 
along 53rd South Street and 59th South, 61st South and 
64th South Streets, and where these streets were crosed 
by the railroad track, the railroad maintained that the 
City could not install the sewer under its tracks without 
its permission. The City maintained that it had jurisdic-
tion to install such sewers under its public highways pro-
vided it did not in any way interfere with or damage the 
railroad property. 
The undisputed evidence is as follows: The railroad 
track in question was constructed in the summer of 1871 
(R.19). At the tilne it was constructed there were no 
deeds or rights of way procured by the railroad over the 
area involved in this law suit. 
The railroad prepared a map of the area in question 
in 1920 which was admitted in evidence as Exhibit D-10. 
This map shows there then existed a travelled roadway 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I _____ """""!!~!!,_.,.,.. _____ . -----------
along the west side of the railroad tracks. The railroad 
offered no evidence as to when travel on Second West 
Street commenced, nor any evidence as to the extent of 
the use of Second West Street. 
Plaintiff produced two· witnesses, J. E. W alhquist 
and J. Clifford Hanson, now mayor of Murray. Walh-
quist lived at 6276 South Second West and now lives at 
121 ·vvest 5900 South, which is adjacent to Second West 
Street (R. 102). Mr. Hanson has lived on Second West 
Street his entire life, part of the time at 6239 and the 
balance at 6191 (R. 120). Both men attended the 24th 
District School which was located on the east side of Sec-
ond West Street at approximately 6100 South (R.104, 
121). The 24th District School was built in 1874 (R. 102-
3), and the only means of ingress and egress to said school 
was from Second West Street (R. 103-123). Both Walh-
quist and Hanson testified that according to their earliest 
recollections, approximately 1899, that in front of the 
24th District School there was travel on both the east and 
west sides of the railroad tracks (R. 105-121). The travel 
on the east side was fron1 a point approximately two 
hundred yards South of the school to a point three to 
four hundred yards North of the school; travel on the 
east side was abandoned about 1930 (R. 124), when the 
railroad tracks were raised and the crossings removed 
(R.125). 
Mr. Hanson testified that according to his earliest 
recollection there were about as many homes on Second 
West Street as there are at the present time (R. 122). 
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Exhibit A prepared by the Plaintiff for this action shows 
the homes abutting upon Second West Street, and it is to 
he noted that there are nine ( 9) homes on the east side of 
Second West Street, whose only means of ingress and 
egress is by means of Second West Street. Mr. Hansen 
remembers ore haulers using Second West Street as 
early as 1900 in hauling ores to the old Germania Smelter, 
the haulers coming from Big and Little Cottonwood Can-
yons down 64th South to Second West and then north to 
the smelter. A power line of Murray City runs down the 
east side of the tracks near the east boundary line of the 
street and has been there since 1914-15 (R.126, 178). 
The travelled portion west of the tracks has been oil 
surfaced, Mr. Hansen says, since 1930 (R.126), and the 
railroad's Exhibit P-37 shows that in 1920 this was an 
oil mulch road. This map also shows water line down the 
west side supplying the houses on both the east and west 
sides of the highway, shows Murray City's pole line run-
ning down the east side, and also shows houses on both 
the east and west sides. 
Alton Lund, an attorney at law and registered ab-
stractor, was employed by the City for the purpose of 
making a search of the records of Salt Lake County. He 
testified that there are very few deeds in the County 
Recorder's office prior to 1872 and that the lands over 
which the street in question and railroad ran were taken 
to patent between 1872 and 1875 (R. 84). He said that 
the streets in Salt Lake County, except for those in sub-
divisions or other City plats are not dedicated (R. 86). 
He said, for example, there is no dedication of State 
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Street (R. 85-88), and that titles to property abutting up-
on the public highways generally runs to the center of the 
street (R. 86). He stated that he searched for deeds con-
veying property abutting upon Second West between 53rd 
and 64th South Streets and found the following deeds 
making reference to a street (R. 77) : 
Deed from J'ames Randle to Sven M. Lovendahl, 
dated June 11, 1875, recorded June 15, 1875 (R. 77); in 
the body of the deed the following reference is made to 
a road: "thence South on the West line of a county 
road," (R. 79). 
Another deed found by Lund ran from James Randle 
to James Winchester and other trustees of the 24th 
School District dated April 7, 1875, which description 
contained the following reference to a country road: 
"Thence North on the East line of county road and paral-
lel and 50 links east of the center of the U. S. Railroad 
track," (R. 80). 
Another deed was found from Peter I-Ianson to 
Thomas Steffensen dated April 1, 1876, which made the 
following reference to a county road: "Thence South 
88° 45' East 9 chains and 30 links (to the West line of 
county road) thence South along the West line of county 
road 5 chains and 78links." 
Another deed was found which ran from Peter !-Ian-
son to Carl F. C. Meyer, dated December 16, 1874, which 
made the following reference to the road: "Thence North 
322 rods more or less to the center of the county road 
(this would refer to 64th South Street) thence on the 
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center of said road South 84¥2 o 2302 rods to the East line 
of a four rod street thence on the East line of said stre€t," 
(R. 81). The four rod street referred to is Second West 
Street. 
The City prepared a Plat of Second West Street be-
tween 5300 South and 6400 South and the same was in-
troduced in evidence as Exhibit B-12, and on this Plat the 
four deeds above referred to are platted showing that 
the county road referred to was located at the same 
place as Second West Street is at the present time. 
In this connection it is to be noted that the deeds 
from Peter Hanson to Carl F. C. Meyer are South of 
64th South Street and Second West Street does not 
at this time extend South of 64th South Street, however, 
Plaintiff caused to he introduced in evidence a copy of 
the official highway plat of Salt Lake County as Exhibit 
P-34; this map having been adopted in 1898 by Salt Lake 
County as the official road map (see Exhibit P-34). This 
map shows Second West Street, or Route 10 as it was 
then known, as extending South of 64th South Stre·et. 
Two exhibits which are unmarked are important in this 
connection, one being a photostat of the index of high-
ways of Salt Lake County and which shows Highway 
10 to be Second West Street, and a photostat of the field 
notes of Highway 10, which also shows Highway 10 to be 
the same as Second West Street. 
The railroad claims ownership under five deeds in-
troduced in evidence as Exhibits P-1, P-2, P-3, P-4, and 
6 
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P-5; the pertinent information is shown as follows: 
Patent To When Deeded to Railroad 
Andrew Cahoon March 3, 1875 December 14, 1874 
Benjamin Wright December 1, 187 4 August 12, 1876 
James Randle December 1, 187 4 February 14, 1876 
Peter Hanson March 5, 1875 April 4, 1876 
Christian Berger July 10, 1872 July 5', 1873 
These deeds grant to the railroad the property trav-
ersed by the highway and railroad with the exception of 
an area of about 758 feet southerly from the North line 
of Section 24 (R. 41). As to this particular strip of land, 
the railroad was unable to show any title or interest other 
than continued user of their tracks. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court found that the 
railroad owned all of the land in controversy from the 
East fence line to a point 11 feet West of the center line 
of the main track of the railroad and found that the City 
was the owner of the land vVest of this line to the fence 
lines on the \Vest and found that the City was the owner 
of a 64 foot street at 64th South Street and a 24 foot 
street at 61st South Street, a 50 foot street at 59th South 
Street and a 26 foot street at 53rd South Street. 
The trial judge visited Second West Street and found 
64th South to be 66 feet wide with a traveled portion over 
the railroad tracks 64 feet wide. 61st South was found 
to be 50 feet wide with a traveled portion over the trackf; 
24 feet wide; 59th South is 66 feet wide with a 50 foot 
traveled area over the railroad tracks; and 53rd South is 
33 feet wide with a 26 foot traveled portion over the 
tracks (see Stipulation of Counsel). 
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THE POINTS THE CITY INTENDS TO RELY 
UPON FOR A REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT 
1. The Court erred in finding that the strip of land 
approximately four rods in width extending from 53rd 
South Street to 64th South Street at a point commonly 
known of as 200 West was not a public thoroughfare, it 
being contrary to the evidence and erred in finding the 
Easterly portion of said four rod strip, to-wit: the por-
tion described in Paragraph 16 of the Findings of Fact 
belonged to the Railroad. 
(a) The rights of the public to any part of 
the four rod strip of land depends upon acceptance 
pursuant to 43 U.S.C.A. 932 prior to the issuance 
of patent. 
(b) 43 U.S.C.A. 932 does not grant to a 
railroad the right to acquire a right of way across 
the public domain and there is no evidence of any 
right in the railroad to construct its line over the 
four rod strip in question in 1871, its right de-
pending upon deeds acquired from the patentees 
between July 5, 1873 and August 12, 1876 and 
the patentees of the land in question and the rail-
road as grantee took said property subject to the 
rights of way acquired by the public prior to the 
issuance of patent. 
(c) The public thoroughfare established by 
the public along Second West Street was of such 
width as was reasonably necessary for the public 
easement. 
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(d) The public thoroughfare once estab-
lished has never been abandoned or vacated. 
ARGUMENT 
1. (a) When the railroad commenced this action 
it seems fair to say that the drafter of the Complaint 
intended to rely upon the rights that the railroad ob-
tained pursuant to the five ( 5) deeds introduced in evi-
dence as Exhibits P-1 through P-5 inclusive. These deeds 
bear dates between July 5th, 1873 and August 12, 1876. 
These deeds covered all of the land in question except 
a strip of about 758 feet North and South running South-
erly from the North line of Section 24 and Plaintiff's only 
claim to this 758 feet would have to depend upon some 
kind of prescriptive right. The court, in its Findings of 
Fact and particularly in Paragraph 16, apparently found 
that 
43 U.S.C.A. 932 
applied to railroads and gave to the railroad a piece of 
land approximately thirty-three (33) feet East of the 
center of its tracks while only running eleven (11) feet 
West. There is not anything to indicate just how the 
court arrived at this lop-sided right of way over the 758 
feet in question. 
It is the position of the City that the four-rod street 
was being used by the public prior to the construction of 
the railroad and that the public right to the highway was 
acquired pursuant to Section 932, supra. 
This court has construed the above section in the 
case of 
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Lindsay Land v. Churnos, 75 Utah 384, 258 
Pac. 646, Utah 1929 
where the section was construed to be a standing offer by 
the Federal Government which could be accepted in any 
manner by the public using the land for a highway or 
by a public body formally accepting a piece of land for a 
highway itself. 
Much of the land in Utah was settled upon and re-
duced to possession many years before any patents were 
issued. The first land office to be established in Utah was 
in 1869 and no patents were issued prior to that date. The 
evidence does not disclose the basis for the issuance of the 
patents to the land in question whether by preemption or 
homestead. Homestead laws required five ( 5) years of· 
occupancy before issuance of patent and if such is the 
basis of the patents to the land in question the street in 
question was occupied by the patentees prior to the con-
struction of the railroad in 1871. This being true it can 
well be asked, upon what right did the railroad rely when 
constructing its tracks~ Having offered no evidence of 
such right we submit it must have been constructed down 
an established public highway, unless we wish to assume 
an illegal act of trespass. 
Neither party was able to produce any direct evi-
dence at the trial on which was first the road or the rail-
road. The following evidence was introduced by the City 
which throws some light on the subject. The 24th District 
School was built in 1874 (R. 102-3). The railroad had 
been constructed at that time and if there was no public 
road on the East of the railroad track as found hy the 
10 
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trial court in this matter, then the trustees of the 24th 
District School acquired a piece of property and built a 
public school which had no means of ingress and egress. 
The evidence is undisputed that from the time the school 
was built until it was demolished in 1907, that the only 
means of ingress and egress was by way of 2nd West 
Street and we think the least that can be said for thi~s 
evidence is that the trustees of the 24th District School, 
when they bought the tract of land in question, certa.inly 
believed that they were acquiring a tract of land which 
abutted upon a public highway. In 1875 when James 
Randle gave to Sven Lovendahl a deed (R. 77) which 
in the body thereof, had a clause which read: "Thence 
South on the West line of a County Road." Certainly 
James Randle thought that at Second West Street along 
which this course of the deed ran, was at that time a 
county road or a public thoroughfare. Peter Hanson 
would likewise have to believe that Second West Street 
was a county road when he gave the deed to Thomas 
Stephenson, and also when he gave the deed to Carl F. 
C. :Meyer (R. 81). James Randle also gave a deed to 
James Winchester with a similar reference to a county 
road, the East line of which was East of the center of the 
U.S. Railroad tracks (R. 81). Now these uncontradicted 
acts of Randle and Hanson, and the trustees of the 24th 
District School certainly evidenced a state of mind of 
people much closer to the facts than anyone· now living 
and, it is respectfully submitted, constitutes the most re-
liable evidence available that Second West Street had 
an East side and a West side and that the railroad track 
11 
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ran down the center thereof. 
The evidence is also undisputed that there are now 
nine (9) homes on the East side of Second West Street 
(Exhibit A) and their only means of ingress and egress is 
by means of Second West Street. About the turn of the 
century, there were nine (9) homes on the East side of 
Second West Street (R. 12). The owners of these homes 
undoubtedly believed at the time they were constructed 
that they were building them upon a public highway. 
The evidence is silent as to whether these householders 
ever had any trouble with the railroad because of their 
being on the East side of the road and having, according 
to the railroad's contention, to cross its right of way and 
tracks to get to the travelled portion of the highway. It 
would seem reasonable that if Second vVest Street only 
existed along the West side of the railroad tracks that 
long before this the railroad and the householders on the 
East side would have come to grips over the use made 
by the householders of the railroad's right of way. If 
the railroad had considered the land East of the tracks 
as its own private property, it undoubtedly would have 
objected to the City's putting its power line down the 
East side of the right of way (R.126, 178). 
(b) Congress enacted: 
43 U.S.C.A. 932 
in 1866. This Section reads as follows : 
"The right of way for the construction of 
highways over public lands, not reserved for pub-
lic uses, is hereby granted." 
12 
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This section has been construed in a number of cases, 
the best reasoned one being 
Burlington , K. & S. W.R. Co. v. Johnson, 16 
Pac. Rep. 125, Kansas 1887 
In this case Johnson had made a homestead entry and 
was in possession of land when the railroad constructed 
a grade and track across a portion of the land occupied 
by Johnson as a homesteader. From an award to John-
son for damages the railroad appealed, claiming that the 
word "highways" in Section 932, supra, embraced rail-
roads. The court held that the language did not lend 
itself to such construction arguing that Congress in 1875 
enacted a special Section 43 U.S.C.A. 934 which granted 
rights of way upon public lands to railroads and by such 
enactment must necessarily have believed that Section 
932 did not grant such right. The court disposed of the 
matter in the following language : 
"The railroad company contends that, because 
he holds under a homestead entry, and has not 
yet acquired the full legal title, he is entitled to 
recover nothing beyond the mere injury done to 
the improvements which he had placed on the 
land. We cannot agree with this contention. The 
claim is based mainly on an act of Congress of 
JUly 26, 1866, which declares that "the right of 
way for the construction of highways over public 
lands not reserved for public uses is hereby 
granted." Rev. St. U.S. paragraph 2477. It is 
argued that railroads are highways within the 
meaning of this provision, and that the plaintiff 
took his homestead subject to the right of the rail-
road to appropriate a right of way over the same 
without any compensation for any value of the 
13 
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soil or damages otherwise than to his improve-
ments. The term "highways" used in the section 
quoted does not, in either its ordinary or strict 
sense, include railroads. It is true that in a certain 
sense a railroad is a public highway to be con-
structed and operated according to law and sub-
ject to public control. It can only be used, how-
ever, in a particular manner, and is not open to 
common use for foot passengers, horse passengers, 
animals and carriages, as an ordinary highway 
may be used. In the usual understanding, a high-
way is one which is common to all people without 
distinction, and which they may travel over on 
foot or horseback or in carriages. Thomp. Highw. 
1; Ang. Highw. 3. A railroad and a comn1on high-
way are essentially different in regard to con-
struction control, and use, as well as ownership, 
and the distinctions are so well understood that 
a mention of them is unnecessary. 
"It is a familiar rule of law that in inter-
preting statutes, words and phases are to be taken 
in the ordinary sense and com1non acceptation, 
unless it appears from the context of the act that 
a different meaning was intended. We discove~ 
nothing in the provision in question, or in the 
subsequent legislation of congress, which indicates 
that an unusual meaning was attached to the word, 
or that it included railroads. Inste&d of that, we 
find that, since the law in question was enacted, 
congress ·has deen1ed it necessary, by both general 
and special acts, to grant right of way to railroads 
over the public domain. Aside from several spe-
cial acts, a general one was passed on March 3, 
1875, granting to any railroad the right of way 
through any public lands of the United States. It 
provided at length the conditions to be observed, 
and the steps that were to be taken in order to 
14 
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secure the benefit of the act. No reference is there 
made to the act of 1866; but congress, as well as 
those who were instrumental in obtaining the 
legislation, seem to have proceeded upon the 
theory that the act of 1866 did not grant a right 
of way for railroads. 18 St. at Large, 482. On 
March 3, 1873, another act was passed by con-
gress, which indicates to sorne extent the legis-
lative understanding of the act of 1866. It was 
then provided that a settler on the public lands, 
either by virtue of the pre-emption or homestead 
law, shall have the right to transfer, by warranty 
against his own acts, any portion of his pre-
emption or homestead for the right of way of 
railroads across such pre-emption or homestead. 
Rev. St. U. S. Section 2288. Neither of these 
enactments purports to modify or repeal the act 
of 1866. It was wholly unnecessary for congress 
to grant a right of way to railroads, or to provide 
that a settler may convey his interest in a pre-
emption or homestead for such purpose, if the act 
of 1866, already in force, embraced railroads with-
in its intent. It is true that the case to which we 
are referred, (Railway v. Gordon, 41 Mich. 420, 
2 N.W. Rep 648) holds that railroads are highways 
within the n1eaning of the act of 1866. The court 
in that opinion concedes that when the term "high-
ways" is used in legislation, the common highways 
of the country are generally to be understood. 
The construction that railroads were intended was 
based on the apparent liberal policy pursued by 
congress in encouraging railroads to build through 
the new and unsettled portions of the country. 
'fhe court, however, expressed doubt in regard to 
theconclusion which it reaehPd, and it does appear 
that its attention was called to the subsequent 
general legislation of congress expressly granting 
a right of way to railroads. An examination of the 
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congressional legislature on the subject, and hav-
ing in mind the rule of interpretation that the. 
usual meaning is to be given to words in the 
statute, unless another is obviously intended, we 
have come to the conclusion that only the common 
highways of the country were intended to be in-
cluded in the term used in the act of 1866." 
The court's finding in paragraph 16 of the Findings 
of Fact must necessarily depend upon construing Section 
932, supra, as applying to railroads. It is respectfully 
submitted that in spite of the conflict in the authority 
that the reasoning in the Johnson case, supra, is per-
suasive and that Section 932 does not grant rights of 
way over the public domain to railroads. Hence, the right 
the railroad acquired to 2nd West Street must, per force, 
have been by possession. The City concedes that the 
railroad has, at this time, a right to maintain 
its railroad down the middle of 2nd West Street but that 
such right is subject to the prior right of the public to 
the use of a four rod street as a public thoroughfare. 
Between 1871 and 187 4 such uses as the railroad was mak-
ing of 2nd West Street had not developed into a pre-
scriptive right and furthern10re the right of the 
railroad would be to that part of the street actually 
used, to-wit eleven (11) feet West of the center line of the 
tracks and the eleven (11) feet East of the tracks, or a 
total distance of twenty one (21) feet. 
1.. (C) The public thoroughfare established by the 
public along Second West Street was of such width as 
was reasonably necessary for the public easement. 
This court, in the case of 
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Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 100 Utah 116 Pac. 2nd 
420, utah 1941 
affirmed the case of 
Whitesides v. Green, 13 Utah 341, 44 P. 1032, 
Utah 1896 
which held that the right acquired by the public by pre-
scriptive use is subject to different rules than a private 
prescriptive use. In the Whitesides case, the Court said: 
"The right acquired by prescriptive use car-
ried with it such width as is reasonably necessary 
for the public easement of travel." 
The original rights of the public acquired for Second 
West Street by its prescriptive use against the Federal 
Government with its consent under Section 932, supra, 
was for a street of reasonable width and Peter Hanson's 
deed to Carl F. C. Meyer (R. 81) referred to Second 
West Street as a four rod street. Most of the pioneer 
streets in Salt Lake County were four rod streets. There 
is no evidence that there was ever a four-rod street on 
either the East or West side of the railroad tracks ; but 
there is now, and has for many years been, a four-rod 
street with the railroad tracks running down the center 
of it. There is evidence of use by the public of the East 
side of the tracks and the power lines of Murray City 
are east of the tracks, supra, and a travelled area some 
five to six hundred yards long on the East side in front 
of the 24th District School was used for many years and 
never abandoned ( R. 124). 
It seems reasonable to say that a four-rod street 
would be a reasonable width for a highway obtained by 
17 
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public use under Section 932, supra, and if the use had 
established the highway before the railroad was con-
structed, it seems reasonable and logical that the travelled 
way would be forced to the East or West side of the 
tracks by the establishment of the railroad which is 
apparently what happened. The householders and abut-
ting property owners on either the East or West side 
still abutted upon a public thoroughfare and did not, by 
the construction of the railroad, become land-locked citi-
zens. 
(d) The public right to use Second "\Vest Street is 
the same today as when it was originally acquired. 
Section 27-1-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which 
reads as follows : 
"All highways once established must continue 
to be highways until abandoned by order of the 
County Commissioners of the County in which 
they are situated, or other competent authority." 
It is respectfully submitted that there is no evidence 
of any abandonment of Second West Street or any part 
of it by the County Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 
the City Commission of Murray City or any other 
competent authority. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully sub1nitted that the evidence in the 
foregoing case discloses that there was a public thorough-
fare over Second West Street between 53rd and 64th 
South Streets, located prior to 187 4: and the reasonable 
intervretation of the evidence would indicate it was 
est::tblished some five ( 5) years or more before that date, 
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and that the public acquired said right by user under 
and pursuant to 43 U.S.C.A. 932, which right has never 
been abandoned or lost to the public and that the evidence 
shows that the reasonable width of the county road thus 
established was four rods, and was so considered by the 
abutting property owners and that it remains and still is 
a four rod public road, subject now to the jurisdiction 
of Murray City in which it is presently located. There 
is no evidence of abandonment. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment should provide that a four rod City street so 
exists, subject to a twenty two (22) foot easement through 
the middle of said street, belonging to the railroad, 
acquired by adverse use, which easement is now owned 
by Plaintiffs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
D. HOWE MOFFAT 
of FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MoFFAT 
AND MABEY 
WENDELL E. DAY, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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